Using nudge theory and some examples of risk communication that followed the Fukushima disaster, this article discusses the influences and justifications of risk communication, in addition to how risk communication systems are designed. To assist people in making decisions based on their own value systems, we provide three suggestions, keeping in mind that people can be influenced (ie, "nudged") depending on how risk communication takes place: (1) accumulate knowledge on the process of evaluating how the method of risk communication and a system's default design could impact people; (2) 
Introduction
The concept of "nudge" has recently received much attention beyond individual scientific fields (eg, economics, behavioral science). To "nudge" someone literally means to push another person with one's elbow; in other words, it is a simple way of getting someone in the mood for something. 1 By carefully conveying messages, designing options or establishing a default setting, one is able to "nudge" others without forcing them to make certain choices, the goal being for them to make good decisions. Nudge theory has its knowledge base in behavioral science; in the United States, it has attracted attention in the form of libertarian paternalism, which goes beyond any partisanship of Democratic or Republican values. Not only is it used in economic policies, but also in public health policies. 1, 2 A recent report showed that in 11 out of 15 randomized controlled trials in the United States, nudge modestly influenced people to make financially smarter choices. 2 Nudge is used in daily life as exemplified by the following story:
One winter weekend, I (Michio Murakami) was out shopping with my wife at our local supermarket in Fukushima. At the entrance, there was a display of locally grown shiitake mushrooms. Impressed, I reached for them, then noticed another display of hot pot soups. I decided that we would have one with shiitake mushrooms for dinner that night. On our way home, I thought I had had no intentions of what to buy before going to the supermarket, but I noticed that the moment I put my hands on those mushrooms, the menu was decided.
In this story, the author was influenced to choose mushrooms and hot pot soup, because the supermarket displayed locally grown shiitake mushrooms and hot pot soups at the entrance. The main idea behind nudge theory is that there are no neutral designs in the world. The supermarket could have chosen to show local shiitake mushrooms or meat from other areas if it had wanted to. Meanwhile, no matter what is at the entrance, consumers have complete freedom in terms of what to purchase. On the other hand, what is at the entrance influences their buying behavior. No matter how one portrays the items, affecting consumers' behavior is unavoidable; thus, it is more beneficial to choose a "better" display method. This is the heart of nudge theory. In the aforementioned example, what a "better" method is possibly depends on the positions of the stakeholders. For consumers, a display is better when they are nudged to choose healthy and fine items at convenient prices. For the supermarket, a display may be one where the supermarket can gain a financial benefit as well as trust from the consumers, helps them stay healthy, and activates local industries. More important, nudgewhether acting as a vehicle for messages, a design of different options, or establishing a default setting-affects people' decisions. Furthermore, it includes relevant discussion on problems of ethical justification related to what a "better" method is. Since "risk communication is an interactive process of exchanging information and opinion among individuals, groups, and institutions" to support decision-making, as stated by US National Research Council (hereafter, NRC), 3 nudge is essentially associated with risk communication.
In the case of Fukushima disaster, public health authorities and professionals play an important role in risk communication. [4] [5] [6] Furthermore, they engaged in risk communication based on individually measured radiation doses, as gauged by personal dosimeters and whole body counters (WBC). 7, 8 Considering the fact that nudge is associated with risk communication-whether intentionally or unintentionally, for better or for worse-it is necessary to demonstrate how nudge is used in risk communication from the angles of both conveying information and a systems' default setting (eg, whether participating in risk communication is set as a default, or applicants can voluntarily take part in risk communication). Furthermore, discussing the ethical justifications of a "better decision" is warranted. Since people can be influenced (ie, "nudged") depending on how risk communication is transmitted, the effects and validity of risk communication should be clarified to assist them in making decisions based on their own value systems.
This study had 3 aims. First, based on nudge theory, we overviewed and systemized the process of evaluating how people could be affected by the method of risk communication and a system's default design by using some examples of risk communication following the Fukushima disaster. Second, we demonstrated the need to clarify the purpose and outcomes of risk communication, with considerations of nudge theory and the impact of the risk communication. Third, to avoid nudge's negative influences, we discussed what risk communication might be ethically unjustifiable. This is the first paper to extract lessons learned from risk communications after the Fukushima disaster using nudge theory.
Methods
In this study, we systemized the effects and validity of risk communication based on nudge theory via 2 categories: (1) the impacts of communication on individuals and (2) the impacts of a system's default design on the public. In each category, we first mention previous results from several medical fields, then explain these findings based on risk communication after the Fukushima disaster. The examples of risk communication included WBC, media coverage, personal dosimeters, and explanatory meetings on thyroid examinations.
How Conveying Risk Communication Could Affect Individuals
Nudge theory is used to communicate with individuals or multiple people. In the medical field, one's risk awareness and decisions differ when one is told "the survival rate is 90%" or alternatively that "the mortality rate is 10%." 9 The values of the 2 expressions are exactly the same, but for the patient, a "90% survival rate" sounds encouraging, while a "10% mortality rate" is frightening. 10 Both expressions are accurate and easy to understand, but the information has a different impact depending on how it is conveyed. People passively receive the information being presented and make a decision. This is why there are no neutral designs.
Regarding a similar example of the different ways people might have received the same information after the Fukushima disaster, one could tell a resident that "there is a 0.1% cancer risk" or instead, inform him/her that "though there is a 0.1% cancer risk, there is a 99.9% chance there is no effect on you." Namely, people are "nudged" according to how risk information is presented, even though 2 expressions contain the same details.
The same can be said for how the results of the WBC survey were shared through newsletters or media coverage. For instance, 1 year after the disaster, the measurement results of the WBC survey in the city of Minamisoma revealed that internal contamination from radiation was not detected in more than 94% of pareticipants. 7 The providers can choose the information that internal contamination was not found among more than 94% of participants, or that it was detected in 6%. Municipalities and governments that wish to convey the area's safety would be more likely to choose the former, and any group that prefers to emphasize danger would choose the latter.
How a risk is expressed depends on the provider's intention. After an assessment of radiation risk based on diet was published, 11 various media's coverage differed, despite the fact that they have received the information from the same source. Some news outlets claimed that the radiation risk from one's diet was higher than that of benzene, 12 whereas others reported that the dose was a fraction of those received from natural radionuclides in the diets of people with normal lifestyles. 13 As described in the cases above, the providers' choice of how to convey risk can nudge people to encourage or to increase anxiety. Anxiety could be useful in dealing with risk, and having concerns after a nuclear power plant accident is indeed natural. On the other hand, avoiding risks could lead to other major risks (risk trade-off; ie, not traveling by plane after 9/11 lead to an increase in traffic accidents 14, 15 ). High risk perception is linked to mental stress 16 ; furthermore, high mental stress and mood disorders are major factors in suicide and other types of deaths. 17, 18 Emphasizing danger in expression of risk information can nudge people to increase anxiety and thus high mental stress, although most people who received the information are not aware of this possibility.
How a System's Default Design Could Affect the Public
Nudge theory is used as a default setting in designing social systems. In medicine, it is used to obtain different results when asking people to mark a section on their driver's licenses that they are "willing to be an organ donor" or to mark a section stating they "do not wish to be an organ donor." 1, 10 Regarding WBC tests in the city of Minamisoma, children were expected by default to be assessed ("Get tested" was the default setting and "Not get tested" was an option), while for adults, those who wished could be tested ("Not get tested" was the default setting and "Get tested" was a choice). The default settings were established because it reflected parents' expectation of an educational effect about radiation on children, as well as the fact that parents want to have continuous monitoring for their children. 19 Consequently, 98% of children were tested in 2013, 20 while only 15% of adults showed up to be tested in the same fiscal year. 21, 22 In the city of Date, in order to grasp the extent of external radiation exposure, the local government began to distribute personal dosimeters for children and pregnant women in regions with high radiation. By 2012, the local government was passing out personal dosimeters to every resident. In Date, people could freely refuse to accept a personal dosimeter, but using one was the default setting. Afterward, some residents who used digital dosimeters were nudged to think about radiation and to end up feeling more anxious than before.
A case in the Kanto region suggests that while many people felt their fear decrease after measuring the ambient dosage, some felt their level of anxiety had grown. 23 When people only assess a single risk, they will see it as being greater than when examining multiple risks 24 ; this state is also known as being "out of sight, out of mind." 25 It is not therefore appropriate to uniformly ask people to measure their exposure without allowing them to obtain individual consultations. Without individual consultations, some people would not understand how to deal with risks; this leads to the potential for increased anxiety and mental stress. In Date, the local government also opened a support center for people to discuss their results and receive advice. The local government also provided sessions to those who desired them, as well as those with relatively high exposure. Later, in regions with low radiation, it switched from universally distributing dosimeters to giving them to people that wanted them (ie, the default setting was switched from "participation" to "nonparticipation"). In addition, it became possible to create more detailed personal consultation services. Similarly, thyroid examinations, implemented after the Fukushima disaster, revealed the need for consultations or follow-up sessions in case technical information on individual risks was provided to individuals themselves. 26, 27 Likewise, personal dosimeters and thyroid examinations, which have both benefit and harm, 28 the default setting can "nudge" people to participate or not to participate the inspections related to risks and therefore to be a key factor for overall public benefit (or harm). Based on these findings, we structured the concept of a preferable default setting in a risk communication system (Figure 1 ). Since the preferable default setting affects rates of participation or consultations, the default setting should be designed according to the balance between public benefit and harm. When public benefit outweighs harm, participation should be set as the default, allowing applicants to have the option to reject being involved. On the other hand, when harm outweighs public benefit, nonparticipation should be set as the default, allowing applicants to choose voluntarily to take part. Furthermore, the cases of personal dosimeters and thyroid examinations revealed that careful consultations or follow-up sessions are necessary when technical information on personal risks is provided to individuals in a system, where the default setting is to be involved (or get tested). As stated earlier, risk communication and the system may unnecessarily increase fear, mental stresses, and harm. Public health authorities should consider possible impacts as well as fairness, and carefully design the default of risk communication systems.
The Need to Clarify the Purpose and Outcomes of Risk Communication, and a Discussion on Ethically Unjustifiable Risk Communication
There is no neutrality in how risk is conveyed and in the default designs of inspections related to risks. Intentionally or unintentionally, anyone involved in risk communication has selected a method for expressing information; this choice clearly has an impact on the public. To the best of our knowledge, communicators or system designers, who involved in some cases after the Fukushima disaster, might not have carefully considered the nudge theory described above, although some providers preferred to emphasize danger. Importantly, people and the public were "nudged" even though the communicators or system designers tried to be neutral. As described in the section "How Conveying Risk Communication Could Affect Individuals," risk information emphasizing danger can nudge people to increase anxiety. As described in the section "How a System's Default Design Could Affect the Public," default settings can nudge public to participate (or not to participate) the inspections related to risks and thus impact on public' overall benefit and harm including anxiety and mental stresses. It is therefore necessary to understand and discuss what might be considered "better" options and how they affect people.
From the angle of nudge theory, there are 2 issues at hand. The first is whether society has enough knowledge of the impacts of risk communication and risk communication systems. Risk communication has very strong experiential elements and there is a limited understanding of how the information being presented or the system being designed could affect people psychologically in the short or long term. This requires society to empirically gather evidence on how risk communication and system default settings impact individuals. Evidence consists of quantitative outcomes as well as the results of qualitative analyses; for instance, people's thoughts and opinions. Sharing the narrative around the risk communication would help indicate how such communication and systems influence people. Gathering narratives, in addition to conducting quantitative empirical research on risk communication and the corresponding systems, would most likely help establish evidence-based risk communication.
The second issue is more fundamental: How does society determine what is "better"? This also relates to the first issue (whether society has enough knowledge of the impacts of risk communication and risk communication systems). This question is associated with the purpose and outcomes of risk communication. The NRC states that "risk communication is successful to the extent that it raises the level of understanding of relevant issues or actions and satisfies those involved that they are adequately informed within the limits of available knowledge." 3 Furthermore, recent risk communication activities in Fukushima showed that medical professionals should intend to support residents' decisions and to promote public health. 29 Since people could be nudged without being aware, it is important to not only enhance the level of understanding and trust among stakeholders; it is also vital to clarify the purpose of risk communication and the system in question. The clarification of the purpose of risk communication (eg, understanding, trust, improved health conditions, acceptance of risks, a reduction in anxiety, and an increase in satisfaction 5, [30] [31] [32] ) is necessary to consider whether the risk communication is socially justifiable.
When we evaluate risk communication from the perspective of nudge theory, we can expect ethical questions to arise at a practical level. For example: "How does society determine what a good decision is?" or "Who is determining-and authorizing-whether something is a good option for society?" Again, gathering narratives on risk communication should provide hints to such questions.
Thaler and Sunstein 1 revealed an aspect of nudge theory related to supporting "better decisions." However, in the field of risk communication, it is currently not clear what makes a "better decision." Hence, we do not propose using nudge theory to promote "better decisions." Instead, we suggest that the nudge's negative influences be eliminated. Concretely, using nudge theory and the examples described above, we provide explanations of unjustifiable types of risk communication, as shown below.
First, as described in the section "How Conveying Risk Communication Could Affect Individuals," when information does not lead to solutions and unnecessarily arouses anxieties and fear, this can worse the public health. It is not thus unjustifiable.
Second, unjustifiable risk communication is information that nudges people to entail unacceptable risks. This kind of risk communication also contravenes the improvement of public health.
As stated in the section "How a System's Default Design Could Affect the Public," a system's default setting influences people to a large extent. Great caution is required if participation is set as the default in a risk communication system and technical information on personal risks is provided to individuals themselves. Hence, third, we believe that systems-lacking individual consultations or follow-up sessions on how to interpret technical information on individual risks-are not acceptable.
Public health authorities must consider the potential impacts and justifications of risk communication; furthermore, they must carefully design each risk communication system. If prepared with caution, such configurations can assist individuals in making beneficial decisions based on their own value systems.
Limitations
This study is limited to cases from the Fukushima disaster. It is still necessary to generalize the findings. Further studies covering various risks at different time stages, from precrisis to crisis, and from different locations, are required.
Conclusion
In this study, based on nudge theory, we overviewed and systemized the effects and validity of risk communication. Risk communicators and public health authorities should consider the possible affects and carefully choose a way to express information and design risk communication systems. We also call for both quantitative and qualitative assessments of how communication strategies influence individuals and what comprises "better" risk communication.
